The Monroe Doctrine's Evolution to "Don Roe Doctrine" Tribute Demands

Key Quotes

"The Monroe Doctrine of, I think it was 1823, I want to say, basically said that America would assert its dominance over the entire American region. And since then, it's changed a number of times. But the way it's being talked about now is as the Trump corollary or the Don Roe Doctrine, which was described in the National Security Strategy documents of the Trump administration put out back in December. And that one's a little different. So we keep seeing these amendments to the doctrine."

The hosts, Tracy Alloway and Joe Weisenthal, introduce the concept of the Monroe Doctrine and its evolution. They highlight how the doctrine has been reinterpreted over time, noting the emergence of the "Don Roe Doctrine" as a modern amendment within the Trump administration's National Security Strategy. This sets the stage for a discussion on how historical foreign policy principles are adapted and applied in contemporary contexts.

"Well, it's certainly been influential and it's certainly been cited repeatedly over the years. I mean, first, I think we need to back up and say exactly what makes it a doctrine. It was never voted on. No court ratified it. It didn't actually assume the status of doctrine until a couple of decades after it was pronounced in 1823 when James Monroe was president at the time."

Greg Grandin, the guest historian, explains the origins and nature of the Monroe Doctrine. He clarifies that it was not a formally ratified legal document but rather a statement that gained the status of a doctrine over time through repeated citation and interpretation. Grandin emphasizes that its influence grew decades after its initial pronouncement.

"And then in 1904, along similar lines, Theodore Roosevelt developed when he was president, he expanded the doctrine with his own corollary to what he called international police power to suppress chronic wrongdoing in Latin America. Now, I must say that most of that chronic wrongdoing was provoked by US banks and US mercenaries and US oil extractors."

Greg Grandin details Theodore Roosevelt's expansion of the Monroe Doctrine. Grandin explains the "international police power" corollary, which allowed the U.S. to intervene in Latin American countries to address perceived "chronic wrongdoing." He critically notes that this wrongdoing was often instigated by American private interests, such as banks and oil companies.

"And so there is a kind of turning back to Latin America. And we can get to this a little bit later if you want. But Trump's actions in Venezuela are a perfect example of what happens when, you know, the United States, you know, its bid to go global fails and it has to return to its hemisphere. And that's why the Monroe Doctrine is so important. Latin America is the first place in which the United States got a sense of itself as an overseas power. You know, it was able to project its power, its financial power, its cultural power, its military power beyond its own borders."

Greg Grandin connects the historical significance of Latin America to U.S. foreign policy with contemporary actions. He argues that when the U.S. experiences setbacks in its global ambitions, it tends to refocus its power projection on its own hemisphere, citing Trump's actions in Venezuela as a prime example. Grandin highlights Latin America's role as the initial arena for the U.S. to develop and exercise its power internationally.

"I mean, normally when presidents turn back to Latin America to kind of regroup or rebalance after global crises, they kind of come up with new kind of worldviews to widen their electoral base, to deepen their coalition, to, you know, they try to create a sense of hegemony, right? So you had FDR using Latin America to put forth a kind of social democratic continental New Deal. Then Reagan after Vietnam, a kind of muscular anti-communist liberalism, but understood in moral terms, a kind of reassertion of American purpose, American sets of itself as a defender of world freedom."

Greg Grandin contrasts Trump's approach to Latin America with that of previous presidents. He explains that historically, U.S. re-engagement with the region after global crises involved developing new ideological frameworks, such as FDR's "continental New Deal" or Reagan's "muscular anti-communist liberalism," aimed at solidifying power and purpose. Grandin suggests that Trump, however, has not attempted to create a comparable governing ideology.

"Yeah, yeah. Well, in Latin America, there are two precedents. One is obviously Manuel Noriega in 1989 when George H.W. Bush sent about 30,000 Marines in to capture Noriega on a warrant, basically to arrest him. It was considered a police action and and that's how it was legally justified. Noriega was an ally of the United States. He was a CIA asset in the 1980s."

Greg Grandin provides historical precedents for U.S. military actions in Latin America involving the apprehension of foreign leaders. He details the 1989 intervention to capture Manuel Noriega, explaining that it was framed as a police action and legally justified. Grandin also notes Noriega's prior relationship with the U.S. as a CIA asset.