Democracies Risk Normalizing Assassination by Eroding Moral High Ground

The killing of Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by a US-Israeli operation, with the US providing intelligence, thrusts a long-simmering debate into stark relief: should democracies engage in assassinating foreign leaders? This conversation reveals the hidden consequences of treating assassination as a mere "contingency" in geopolitical struggle, demonstrating how the erosion of a moral high ground can lead to a world where such actions become normalized, even by the very democracies that once condemned them. Leaders, policymakers, and anyone concerned with international stability should read this to understand the systemic risks and the historical precedents that make this rare act profoundly consequential, offering a strategic advantage by understanding the long-term fallout that conventional, immediate-threat-focused thinking misses.

The Slippery Slope: From Contingency to Convention

The recent strike against Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a joint US-Israeli operation where the US provided intelligence, marks a significant moment, pushing the question of assassinating foreign leaders back into the spotlight. This isn't a new dilemma for the United States. As the transcript details, the Cold War era saw the US viewing assassination as just another tool in the arsenal against the Soviet Union. Professor Luca Trenta notes that there was a "sense that assassination was just another contingency, something that the United States could not entirely exclude in the confrontation with the Soviet Union." This perspective, driven by a perceived existential threat, led to covert plots and enabled local allies to carry out assassinations, as seen in the 1961 killing of Dominican leader Rafael Trujillo. The CIA was also involved in plotting against figures like Fidel Castro.

This era of clandestine operations eventually came to light, leading to congressional investigations like the Church Committee in the mid-1970s. The committee's findings were stark, declaring assassinations "incompatible with American principles, international order and morality." This moment represented a brief, yet crucial, period of self-reflection. Historian Timothy Naftali explains that the investigations fostered a sense that "maybe if we are a democracy, and if we are to be different from the enemies that we are supposedly fighting, we should not be doing these things." This sentiment led President Gerald Ford to issue an executive order in 1976 banning political assassinations, a ban that his successors, Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, also upheld.

"The investigations of the Church Committee really provide a brief moment of self-reflection for US politicians, for the US public, in which there is a sense that maybe if we are a democracy, and if we are to be different from the enemies that we are supposedly fighting, we should not be doing these things."

-- Luca Trenta

The post-Ford era saw a deliberate avoidance of overt assassination, though the lines were sometimes blurred. Operations against Libya's Muammar Gaddafi and Iraq's Saddam Hussein involved targeting command and control facilities, with the implicit understanding that their deaths would not be mourned. Brent Scowcroft, national security advisor under George H.W. Bush, acknowledged this ambiguity when discussing the targeting of Saddam Hussein: "Do you want him killed? Uh, well, we don't do assassinations, but yes, we targeted. We targeted all the places where Saddam might have been." This suggests that even while adhering to the ban, presidents found assassinations distasteful, and understood the public's sentiment.

The Post-9/11 Shift: The Taboo Dissolves

The landscape dramatically shifted after the September 11th, 2001 attacks. The authorization of "all necessary means" to go after the perpetrators effectively opened the door to assassination as a tool. Naftali points out, "Well, all necessary means includes assassination. And I think that the taboo, if you want to call it, an elite and public taboo against using assassination disappears." The advent of armed drones provided a new, seemingly precise, method for executing such strikes. Initially, these drones targeted alleged terrorists, not heads of state or high-ranking government officials.

However, President Trump's 2020 drone strike against Iranian general Qasem Soleimani blurred this critical distinction. Soleimani, while considered a terrorist by the US, was a high-ranking official in the Iranian government. This action, as the transcript notes, elicited retaliatory plots from Iran against Trump and other US officials, demonstrating a clear escalation in the consequences of such targeted killings.

"All necessary means includes assassination. And I think that the taboo, if you want to call it, an elite and public taboo against using assassination disappears."

-- Timothy Naftali

The recent killing of Ayatollah Khamenei, a joint operation where the US provided intelligence, represents a further step in this evolution. President Trump's boast about Khamenei being "unable to avoid our intelligence and highly sophisticated tracking systems" underscores the increasing ease with which such operations can be conducted. Yet, as Professor Trenta warns, this capability comes with profound implications. The act of a democracy killing a foreign head of state sets a dangerous precedent. If democracies engage in such acts, Trenta argues, "other countries might follow the same example, and there will be nothing that democracies will be able to say when that happens." This erosion of the moral high ground, and the potential loss of the taboo against assassinations, is a significant downstream effect that could destabilize the international order and create a more dangerous world for everyone. The immediate perceived advantage of removing a threat is overshadowed by the long-term consequence of normalizing a practice that democracies once deemed fundamentally incompatible with their values.

Key Action Items

• Reinforce Executive Order 11905 (or equivalent): Reiterate and strengthen the executive order banning political assassinations, ensuring clarity on what constitutes an "assassination" versus a military operation. (Immediate Action)
• Establish a High-Level Review Board: Create a non-partisan body to assess the strategic, ethical, and legal implications of any proposed action targeting foreign leaders, requiring a higher threshold for approval than current counter-terrorism operations. (Longer-term Investment: 6-12 months for establishment and initial reviews)
• Public Education Campaign: Initiate a campaign to educate the public and policymakers on the historical context of assassination bans, the long-term consequences of their erosion, and the strategic disadvantages of losing the moral high ground. (Ongoing: Begin within the next quarter)
• Develop Contingency Plans for Retaliation: Proactively map potential retaliatory actions from targeted states or non-state actors and develop robust defensive and diplomatic strategies to mitigate them. (Immediate Action)
• Invest in Diplomatic Solutions: Significantly increase investment in diplomatic channels and conflict resolution mechanisms as the primary tools for addressing geopolitical threats, reducing reliance on kinetic options. (Ongoing: Shift resource allocation over the next 12-18 months)
• International Coalition Building: Work with democratic allies to re-establish and strengthen international norms against the assassination of foreign leaders, fostering a united front against such practices. (Longer-term Investment: 18-24 months for significant impact)
• Embrace Strategic Patience: Cultivate a political and public tolerance for strategies that may not yield immediate, visible results but offer greater long-term stability and uphold democratic values. This requires reframing "success" beyond immediate threat neutralization. (Cultural Shift: Ongoing, requires sustained effort)